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ABSTRACT
 
Problem; Can Henrik Ibsen's Hedda Cabler be expli
 
cated equally credibly using the contradictory concepts
 
of reality advocated by the contemporary philosophers
 
Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard and the novel ideas of Freud?
 
Is the artist equally capable of chronicling the history
 
of intellectual thought as the historian?
 
Research method and design: Pertinent aspects of
 
each philosopher's concepts of reality were minutely com
 
pared with the Characters in Hedda Gabler to determine
 
the basic motivation for their acts. Each of the three
 
philosophers' views were presented and reviewed in the
 
chronological order of their works and used as a measur
 
ing device to determine the feasiblity of the various
 
characters' motivations for their acts.
 
Conclusions: The study shows conclusively that
 
the artist is equally capable of recording the history
 
of thought as the historian, even in his own milieu.
 
Ibsen created a piece of art that not only meshed the
 
contradictory concepts of Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard
 
in a single dramatic portrait, but even anticipated the
 
Freudian idea of reality. He was further able to present
 
the dialectic antithesis of classicism and existentialism
 
which became the new synthesis--modern realism.
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After Peer Gvnt (I867), Ibsen remarked that never
 
again would drama be written in verse, and he turned to
 
other modes; ^ the publication of Hedda Gabler (I890)
 
followed the death throes of the Romantic movement. This
 
thesis will examine the dianoia (thought) of Hedda Gabler
 
to determine whether it could be satisfactorily explicated
 
according to the views of Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard and
 
Freud. The philosophies of these three men all exhibit
 
a similar sense of realism; Schopenhauer's biological
 
naturalism contains the same inherent deromanticizing
 
iconoclasm of Freud's psychological naturalism. Both
 
views tend to reduce the transcendental possibilities ex
 
tolled by Romanticism and present man as a severely pro
 
scribed creature who can only ponder his impotence to cir
 
cumvent destiny. Their views differ from Kierkegaard's
 
existentialism only to the extent that Kierkegaard's pro
 
vided some latitude, under the yoke of determinism,
 
where man might regain some of his lost nobility through
 
his courage to choose--within his narrowly proscribed
 
freedom--a line of action that disregards social pres
 
sures and might lead to an authentic "life."
 
The contrast between these predominantly pessimist
 
ic views and Romantic optimism is indicated in the name
 
ascribed to them--Realism. It is generally agreed that
 
^ Eric Bentley, The Plavwright as Thinker (New
 
York: Harcourt Brace and World, 19^6), p. 91.
 
realism "began in the mid-nineteenth century, and that its
 
distinguishing characteristics are colloquial language,
 
the use of the "common" man's psychology, and "natural"
 
or plausi"ble action deriving from cause and effect sit-

nations. Realism strained toward two tasks; to achieve
 
an exciting dramatic effect without violating a feeling
 
of "naturalness," and to achieve an elevation of the
 
spirit of expression. This new and special kind of natur
 
alness, derived from scientific theories of the day,
 
claimed that men were deprived of free will and that
 
characters reacted to situations rather than precipitat
 
ing action. Man's future "became a matter of the genetics
 
of Darwin and the social pressures described by August
 
Comte. Nietszche's Zarathustra had just recently pro
 
nounced God dead and Schopenhauer had earlier apotheo
 
sized the will in the same fell stroke that had rendered
 
the intellect servant to instinct. Comte, predicting
 
that social institutions develop along predictable pat-

L
 
terns, Freud postulating his historic and naturalistic
 
2 Kenneth MacGowen and William Melnitz, Golden
 
Ages of the Theater (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Pren
 
tice Hall, 1959), p. 61.
 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 1st ed., s. v.
 
"Nietzsche," by Walter Kaufman.
 
i),
 
Jonathan H. Turner, The Structure of Sociolog
 
ical Theory (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 197^) P*
 
16.
 
paradigm of man, ^ Darwin, in his removal of that trans
 
cendental ingredient of Stardust as one of the basic
 
constituents of man, all relegated men to impotent con
 
clusions inherent in the vast and eternal premise or
 
nature of things. ^  Emile Zola and the Goncourt brothers
 
were busy reducing the artist to the level of mere chron
 
icler of the deplorable human condition, a condition de
 
riving from implacable social and psychological forces in
 
the innate human predilection for bestiality.
 
The dream lay shattered, and Schopenhauer the mis
 
anthrope gloated over his apparent prescience, leaving it
 
to the lone and introverted Kierkegaard to rescue from
 
the shattered hopes of European man a way in which the in
 
dividual might still escape the despair of impotence
 
through existentialist freedom of duty with passion. In
 
to this tangled web of conflicting thought Ibsen nursed
 
into life the account of a woman beset with conflicting
 
ideas that eventually destroyed her. It is a story of an
 
anachronistic and aristocratic woman trapped in the time
 
warp of incipient egalitarianism, a story of a natural
 
^ Encvclo-pedia of Philosophy, 1st ed., s. v.
 
"Sigmund Freud," by Alasdair Maclntyre.
 
^ Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species by
 
Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Fav
 
ored Races in the Struggle for Life (n. p.; n. p.. IS'^O),
 
n. pag.
 
woman seeking escape from the demanding daemons of her im
 
perious and instinctual will through the therapy of mar
 
riage and generation, a story of a nineteen-century Per
 
sephone attempting to gather souls for Lord Dis.
 
Schopenhauer's The World as Will and Idea (1819) ^ 
 
was a frontal attack on the basic romantic idealism of
 
Hegel's view that mankind might eventually attain the Uto
 
pian perfection postulated centuries earlier by Christ
 
ianity. But while Hegel's dialectical triads leaned heav
 
ily upon intellectual methodology, Schopenhauer derided
 
the intellect as a mere instrument of desire, and as
 
serted that the will is the ilan vital of man. It was
 
not, however, the free will the theologians spoke so ap
 
provingly of. It was rather a striving, persistent will
 
of imperious desire which employed intellect to ration
 
alize the propriety of possession of a thing desired. And
 
when reason no longer served a man he could with impunity
 
desert reason.
 
All life is strife, cried the pessimistic Schop
 
enhauer; a clash of wills--except when man makes the two-

O
 
backed beast. The reproductive organs are the proper
 
7
 
Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea,
 
trans. Konstantin Kolenda (New York: The Bobbs Merrill
 
Company, Inc., I96O), p. 7^­
® Will Durant, Story of Philoso-phv (New York:
 
Simon and Schuster, 1926), p. 256.
 
focus of the will and form the opposite pole to the brain
 
which represents knowledge. This is why, he reasoned,
 
the Greeks worshipped the phallus and the Hindus the lin­
gam. Hesiod and Parmenides said that Eros is the first,
 
the creator, and the principle from which all things
 
proceed (Durant, p. 256). The principle matter is not
 
the reciprocation of love, but possession. Nature is
 
the best eugenics and love is a deception practiced by
 
nature, a deception which must vanish after the attain
 
ment of the end of the species. If Petrarch's passion
 
had been sated, his song would have been silenced. Lov­
borg's passion culminated in his aborted manuscript,
 
Hedda's in death.
 
Yet, argues Schopenhauer, will defeats even death
 
by the strategy and martyrdom of reproduction, observ
 
able in the spider who is eaten by the female he has
 
just fertilized, the wasp who devotes itself to gathering
 
food for the offspring it will never see and the man who
 
wears himself to ruin in the effort to feed, clothe and
 
educate his children (Durant, p. 258). There is some
 
thing of nature perverted here, for Hedda does not dem
 
onstrate this dedication to progeny, though Thea does.
 
Hedda, however, patently shows she possesses a ravening,
 
yet perverted eros force, an irresistible urge to pro
 
create that another generation would call the libido,
 
its restless energy sublimated into art and architecture.
 
6 
Ibsen was aware that the attraction of the sexes might
 
manifest itself in astonishing garb. In masterful strokes
 
this taciturn Scandinavian built with the glowing medium
 
of symbol and irony a tale of perverse libido, where
 
eros metamorphosed into thanatos. Hedda, incipient nat
 
ural mother, beset with the strangling injunctions of a
 
repressive society, was incapable of integrating the two
 
opposite forces loosed within her. On the one hand, her
 
elan vital. the Schopenhaueran indominatable will, raged
 
(
 
in the cavern of her being like some Freudian Scylla
 
whose only raison was the entrapment of masculine gam
 
etes. And on the other hand, her intellect—servant,
 
said Schopenhauer, of desire--shaped by repressive social
 
forces whose objective it was to preserve the many even
 
at the expense of the few, cringed at the thought that
 
appetite might defy society. Will and intellect, Scylla
 
and Charybdis, parasites of the flesh, housed in the same
 
host; here was a scenario for conflict.
 
But how is it that intellect, lately declared
 
thrall to will, should find itself arrayed against its
 
master? Enigmatically, Schopenhauer, the philosophical
 
prestidigitator, pronounced intellect the Oedipus of fa
 
ther will, who rose up and slew his progenitor (Durant,
 
p. 262). The trick is, said our misogynist, simply to
 
defeat the desire to live, for who escapes back into
 
timelessness escapes also the pain of living; it is a
 
view reminiscent of Ecclesiastes. and not unlike the Budd
 
hists' Nirvana. Here the audacious philosopher offers his
 
piece de resistance, suicide, although it was a solution
 
Schopenhauer himself did not utilise. The philosopher,
 
argued Schopenhauer, need not seek refuge in the land of
 
shadows to escape the slavering appetite. In him reason
 
has teamed with intelligence to cool the fires of desire
 
and allow the man to live out his days in the contempla
 
tion of the despair inherent in the human condition. No
 
thing could have "been further from Hedda's situation. No
 
philosopher would have dallied tantalizingly with Judge
 
Brack, would have toyed with the bird-like Mrs. Elvsted's
 
fears, would have encouraged Eilert Lovborg to disregard
 
his lust for liquor, would have denied the very exist
 
ence of love.
 
No, Hedda's intellect was still thrall to will,
 
and her fear of social repression was simply a declara
 
tion of subjection to a force that held the power of life
 
and death over her (ostracism). But Hedda was cunning,
 
and she found relief in the manipulation of those around
 
her. It is a short step from Schopenhauer's "will to
 
live" to Nietszche's "will to power" and can be taken, I
 
believe, without violating Schopenhauer's fundamental
 
views. Hedda, admittedly an impotent coward, sought con
 
trol over the members of the very group she feared. Aunt
 
Julie and Berta were insignificant pawns in her power
 
8 
game. Tesman seduced into a sterile marriage, Eilert,
 
manipulated to the point of moribundity, and Thea, whose
 
very namesake suggests innocence and faith, fri^tened
 
by the envious Hedda's threat to yank her passionate red
 
hair—symbolic yearning for the courage that passion
 
lends one's acts.
 
Here is the Schopenhaueran tension between the will
 
and the intellect, with will representing desire or in
 
stinct and intellect representing the forced imposition
 
Q
 
of social restraints upon the innocents of "Arcadia."
 
Ibsen, polarizing this tension, creates multiple layers
 
of conflict, and Hedda contains both polarities of this
 
schism. She is, in fact, schizophrenic and the two per
 
sonalities are locked in combat. The final "leap", her
 
rejection of life, along with the circumspection with
 
which she weighed all her acts--her caution, if you will-­
are indicators that the intellect has gained supremacy,
 
a fact she frequently laments. One cannot disregard
 
the supreme irony; the fact that she meets her death
 
through the destruction of the organ of sapience, the
 
brain, while Lovborg the sensual man, the man of appe
 
tites, the man whose will directs him,surrenders his
 
9
 
A green world of pastoral simplicity and hap
 
piness, such as Eden, where the innocents experience an
 
idyllic and sequestered life.
 
life to an accidental (nonintellectualized) slug through
 
the bowels, the organ of sentience. Hedda's death, with
 
the hallmarks of ratiocination, and Lovborg's accidental
 
death following surrender to his appetite for wine and
 
women, obey with startling clarity the Schopenhaueran
 
paradigm of "reality."
 
And yet, Hedda is not totally cerebral. Where
 
every species fights for the matter space and time of
 
others--in the Schopenhauer reality, homo homini lunis-­
man is wolf to man (Durant, p. 256). Hedda is certainly
 
a wolf to Eilert, robbing him of life, and wolf to Tesman,
 
wooing him into a sterile marriage. Her bite, not unlike
 
that of the lycanthrope, transforms the bumbling Tesman
 
into an equally unethical wolf condoning her destruction
 
of Eilert's manuscript, since it will lead to his own ap
 
pointment at the university. And Brack! Here is the
 
quintessential wolf, hiding his lupine essence beneath
 
the black robes of justice, as he cautiously insinuates
 
himself into the sacrosanct area of Hedda's marriage.
 
Hedda's predominant intellectualism exorcises
 
passion and transforms her into a coward fearful of ex
 
ercising her will. It contrasts keenly with Thea's
 
predominant elan vital. This woman of desires--wearing
 
her mane of red hair as a badge--impetuously leaves her
 
husband and his children to follow Lovborg, and tells
 
Hedda she could not help what she did, that she did what
 
10 
she had to do. Here is the Schopenhauer earth mother.
 
"Woman is the culprit here; for when knowledge has reach
 
ed to will-lessness, her thoughtless charms allure man
 
again into reproduction. Youth has not intelligence
 
enough to see how brief these charms must be; and when
 
the intelligence comes, it is too late." (Durant, p. 266)
 
Ibsen has inverted and distorted this Schopen­
haueran utterance by presenting Eilert's manuscript as
 
a product of his and Thea's sublimated erotic energy.
 
The transformation of this symbolic child into a product
 
of the intellect makes the manuscript no less a product
 
of eros. Irony is piled upon irony, like Ossa upon Pe­
lion, for it is Hedda—pregnant by the bumbling Tesman-­
who might have participated in such an intellectual birth.
 
How she lamented her exclusion from this erotic congress!
 
Schopenhauer concurred with the ancient utterance
 
that who increases knowledge increases sorrow, adding
 
that the genius suffers most. Memory and foresight mere
 
ly add tjoe the misery (witness Prometheus' plight), and
 
most of our suffering lies in retrospect and anticipation;
 
and Hedda the circumspect, Hedda the intellectual, was
 
born to suffer. Life is a pendulum that swings between
 
the pain of want and the ennui of temporary satiation
 
(Durant, p. 258). To combat the deadly ennui she plays
 
an even more deadly game of manipulation.
 
Ironically she finds a confessor in Judge Brack.
 
11 
She admits her ennui, admits her fatigue, admits she has
 
married Tesman "because it was the line of least resist
 
ance and because she had begun to fear for her social
 
status. Trapped in the Schopenhaueran ennui, re
 
duced to the role of incubator, conscious of her quint
 
essential powerlessness, hoping, as she continues to
 
test the power of her will against the chain of events
 
which become increasingly impossible to control, she
 
feels the parasite within her, and her rebellious intel
 
lect rejects that part of herself over which she has no
 
control. Again ironically, it is the flesh which she
 
would destroy that gives sustenance to the intellect.
 
The Schopenhaueran view emphasises Ibsen's use
 
of irony, and the irony in this play is ubiquitous. Even
 
as Hedda, with wilfull if shortsighted hubris, seeks the
 
status of the classic heroine, her cowardice limits her
 
to manipulations and vicarious participation in Eilerfs
 
success and failure, and the very fear of scandal suggests
 
a sterile impotency as the fetus grows within her. The
 
general's pistols, a traditional symbol of the phallus,
 
are instruments of sterile death; Hedda, a woman biolog
 
ically, has the aspirations of a man. The thanatos urge
 
toward death is expressed by a woman who nurses new life
 
Henrik Ibsen, Hedda Gabler, trans, unknown
 
(New York! Random House, I890), p. 5^3­
12 
in her womb. She who seeks power so desperately is denied
 
it because of a rationalized cowardice, while Thea is a
 
powerful influence on Eilert and George because of her non-

rationalized fearlessness. Judge Brack, the administrator
 
of justice admits he has no objection to backways—trans
 
lated as underhanded courses—and repudiates his social
 
function of law and order. An upright ethical doctor of
 
anthropology, George Tesman, conceals the burning of the
 
manuscript, and his act leads indirectly to the death of
 
Lovborg.
 
There is yet another view of Hedda's actions, ap
 
propriately described by Soren Kierkegaard, which provides
 
some release from the unrelenting pessimism characteris
 
tic of Schopenauer's views. Kierkegaard viewed the
 
Schopenaueran despair as only a response to the threat
 
of meaninglessness. He viewed this despair as only an
 
expression of the loss of hope; the answer to which he
 
asserted, was neither in hedonism (which both Hedda and
 
Lovborg had previously practiced) nor in speculative
 
and abstract thought such as the writing of anthropo
 
logical treatises (Ibsen, p. 518). One must turn inward,
 
said Kierkegaard, into the subjective self, into the mic
 
rocosm, where one finds earnestness, decision, passion
 
Encvclonedia of Philosophy, 1st ed., s. v.
 
Soren Kierkegaard," by Alasdair Maclntyre.
 
13 
commitment, and the freedom to gain unification. Your
 
own despair will direct you to your subjective self (Mac-

Intyre, Kierkegaard, p. 509)• Lovborg found earnestness
 
and passion in his literary creation, and yet he was am
 
bivalent, for, though he was a passionate man, he was
 
also an intellectual, a scholar.
 
Man's despair, asserted Kierkegaard, intensifies
 
his subjectivity—his turning within—and makes it a
 
gateway to the authentic self, as Lovborg's despair,
 
evident in his surrender to alcoholism, becomes a cata
 
lyst toward the discovery of his genuine self. In em
 
bracing that despair, the self gives birth to itself
 
and passes from the Kierkegaardian esthetical (childish)
 
stage of indecision to the ethical stage of decisive com
 
mitment. One is responsible only when he makes a choice,
 
said Kierkegaard, and the ethicality of his choice de
 
pends upon the degree to which it is drawn from within,
 
rather than from established standards (a criterionless
 
choice) posited solely upon non-social aspects (Maclntyre,
 
Kierkegaard, p. 509)­
In 1843 Kierkegaard published the curious two
 
volume Either/Or; A Fragment of Life, in which he ex
 
pounded what has since been called the first statement
 
of the existentialist idea. His father, urging him into
 
theology for which Kierkegaard felt no affinity, was in
 
strumental in his eventual rejection of all rationalized
 
14 
12
 
systems. Systems, he reasoned--and Hegel's was the
 
quintessence of all that he deplored--forced the indivi­
dual into a pre-formed mold, 13^ forcing personal develop
 
ment along strict and inflexible lines with no considera­
14

tion for the individuality of the person.
 
He rejected the construction of systems and con
 
cepts, laying the utility of any particular concepts upon
 
the will of the individual. All hinges on choice, hence,
 
responsibility is his. The inherent paradox led Kierke
 
gaard to publish several contradictory treatises under
 
various noms-de-plume; only in such a manner could he
 
avoid the charge that he too was preaching a concept or
 
system.
 
Kierkegaard maintains that every individual is
 
12 Whether Kierkegaard's father sought guilt with
 
the gusto of the flagellant, his son, born old, shouldered
 
the burden of his society, and sadly renounced his own
 
marriage plans for a life of ethics and religion, even as
 
he extolled the virtues of marriage for the ethical man.
 
13 Hegel's system was a closed system (even though
 
it progressed toward Utopia) in that the intellectual con
 
cept gave his dialectic the very form that the existent
 
ialist decried. "I shall shape my own essence," said the 
existentialist. "And I shall do it with passion, not cold 
intellect." 
14
 
The classical view encompassing Naturalism,
 
Romanticism and Rationalism, positing essence before ex
 
istence, is shattered by this existentialistic approach
 
which stresses the freedom and uniqueness of the indivi
 
dual to move from class to class, profession to profession
 
and hence to his own authenticity.
 
15 
confronted with the choice of leading the aesthetic or
 
the ethical life. The aesthetic way is a sophisticated
 
and romantic hedonism, an ever-frustrating pursuit of
 
diversion and pleasure in sexual libertinism, travel,
 
or the arts. Each new experience draws him closer to
 
the day when there are no new diversions and he has lit­
terally done it all. He is now thrown back upon nostalgia
 
and sentimentality, as he attempts to relive those excit
 
ing first experiences. Just as Hedda becomes aware that
 
she is jaded, "...danced myself tired." (Ibsen, p. 538),
 
the aesthete comes to realize that his search for novelty
 
has led him to the threshold of despair. In Purify
 
Your Hearts! Kierkegaard says, "See him in his season of
 
pleasure. Did he not crave for one pleasure after anoth
 
er, variety his watchword?" (Maclntyre, Kierkegaard, p.
 
509), Desire has blunted the pain of self-awareness, but
 
as the person is forced to turn more frequently toward
 
reminiscence, he is forced back toward that same conscious
 
ness from which he sought escape.
 
Recoiling from the despair of aestheticism one
 
In Either/Or the young person who has chosen
 
the aesthetic, "...has not chosen himself; like Narcissus
 
he has only fallen in love with himself. Such a situation
 
has certainly ended not infrequently in suicide." Kierke
 
gaard, Either/Or. I, p. 36.
 
•j ^
 
Also in many pages of Hedda Gabler. Hedda re
 
iterates again and again the failure of her headlong but
 
failed flight into hedonism.
 
16 
will eventually, and with total freedom of choice, elect
 
the ethical way of life. Marriage, hints Kierkegaard,
 
is an excellent institution in which one finds a satis
 
factory ethical way of life, for here lies the sphere of
 
duty, universal rules, unconditional demands and tasks. 17
 
The choice is made with passion and has no criterion, but,
 
he adds paradoxically, were the choice wrong, the inten­
18

sity of the passion will correct any error. The con
 
tradictory and paradoxical quality of Kierkegaard's views
 
are patent—which is not to say that such views are inap
 
plicable to the explication of Hedda Gabler; for one eas
 
ily divines that the primary difference between Schopen
 
hauer and Kierkegaard's views is the concept of freedom
 
of choice. It is important to indicate that the Ibsen
 
characters are not consciously Kierkegaardian and Schopen­
haueran in thought. These paradigms are useful only in
 
casting them in a more illuminating perspective. That is
 
^ It must be clear, however, that this does not
 
approximate the confining system such as constructed by
 
Hegel. Kierkegaard took extreme precautions by publish
 
ing many and contradictory views under various pen names
 
so he might avoid the criticism surely to be provoked by
 
his paradoxical statements; namely of the construction of
 
a system concomitant with his repudiation of systems.
 
1 R
 
It would appear that, were one intellectually
 
convinced of the error in a contemplated action, and one
 
resolutely committed oneself to such an action, passion
 
must be an absolutely necessary ingredient of such act.
 
Hence, Kierkegaard's paradox of passion tends to weaken
 
one's urge to charge Hedda with insufficient passion in
 
her cerebrated suicide.
 
17 
to sayf for example, that Hedda does not lament her self-

awareness as a source of anguish, hut we the viewers sus
 
pect that were she perhaps less self-conscious, her des
 
pair would decrease correspondingly.
 
Using the degree of self-awareness as a criter
 
ion, one might hypothesize a hierarchy of anguish in the
 
characters of Hedda Gahler. One might even determine
 
which of the characters seeks, with the greatest urgency,
 
surcease from pain. Permit me to tarry for a moment and
 
contemplate the propriety of comparing the degree of in
 
dividual anguish with the degree of this consciousness
 
of self. Hedda is a cerebral individual, who admittedly
 
finds pleasure in the repartee with Judge Brack. Con
 
sciousness increases with intelligence, and they may well
 
"be one and the same thing. This is the old paradoxical
 
bugaboo of the existentialists; the organ of thought at
 
tempting to shape being into a concept or system. Being
 
refuses to yield to system and absurdity is the result.
 
To defeat absurdity is to repudiate consciousness; Hed
 
da's answer to this paradox is self-annihilation.
 
Lovborg, however, cannot be so inextricably caught
 
up in his anguish, for did he not (albeit under the in
 
spiration of Thea) create the manuscript--symbol of cere
 
bration? With the inspiration of sublimated eros he has
 
created, and only by accident does he find death, iron
 
ically with the symbolic phallus, the dueling pistol. If
 
18 
anguish is equal to cerebration, Hedda is the greater suf
 
ferer, for only the most desperate seek escape through su
 
icide.
 
Thea is not cerebral, but the consummate female,
 
whose raison is a catalyst by virtue of inspiration.
 
Her anguish is minimal for two reasons; first, she gives
 
her passions free rein, and no internal schisms tear her
 
apart. She is thrall to her passions and ergo free in
 
the Kierkegaardian sense. Secondly, she is so caught up
 
in her commitment to duty--toward her child, the manu­
script--that she has removed herself from the aesthetic
 
phase of life in favor of the ethical stage.
 
Hedda finds herself in the aesthetic phase of
 
development, immobilized there, it seems, in stasis.
 
Kierkegaard's remark that these individuals not infreq
 
uently resort to suicide, is remarkably apropos. So also
 
is Hedda's confession to Judge Brack, that she has grown
 
tired, that she had married Tesman simply because it was
 
the easiest thing to do and that she had begun to fear
 
for her social status (Ibsen, p. 5^0). She is guilty of
 
the very crime that led Kierkegaard to formulate his con­
cepts--acquiescence and conformity to the values of
 
others, and she is all that Kierkegaard has rejected, for
 
not only does she conform to the community ethic--at
 
least on the surface--but she then methodically attempts
 
to dictate the acts of her peers.
 
19 
Hedda's refusal to follow the pathway to her auth
 
enticity through the repudiation of social strictures is
 
still a choice and the fact of this choice makes her re
 
sponsible for her predicament. Unlike Schopenhauer's
 
baited bear raging against the stings of unfeeling na
 
ture, Hedda cannot take strength in the knowledge that
 
one more powerful than she has meted out this suffering.
 
She is a coward, fearful of choosing the only path that
 
can lead her to authenticity, for she does not know that
 
sufficient passion would have neutralized any cause for
 
fear. What a pity she had not read Either/Or!
 
Why, one muses, is Thea courageous and Hedda not
 
courageous? Hedda remarks to her "Oh, if you could only
 
understand how poor I am. And fate made you so rich...
 
I have such a fear of scandal." (Ibsen, p. 558) The be
 
lief that Hedda's dilemma (her cowardice) can be correct
 
ed forms much of the dialectic tension in the play. One
 
senses that her absence of courage is a matter of choice.
 
She is "guilty" of cowardice--damning for a general's
 
daughter. On the other hand, how can one beset by her
 
biological limitations be deemed guilty? This paradox
 
is the dramatic core of Hedda Gabler.
 
Kierkegaard has suggested that man can redeem
 
himself through courage (Maclntyre, Kierkegaard, p. 338).
 
In fact he made much of courage, though he spent pre
 
cious little time identifying the source of the stuff.
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It is implied that courage is innate, that it is present
 
in the pre-essence stage of existence. Although care
 
fully skirting the hogs of philosophical arguement, I
 
am compelled to remark that throu^out Hedda Gabler
 
there is the pervading sense that Hedda can find the
 
courage she yearns for. "Ah, yes...courage. If only
 
one had that!...Then life would perhaps be liveable af
 
ter all." (Ibsen, p. 558) She has simply refused to ap
 
ply Kierkegaard's antidote to despair, has refused to
 
permit the despair to lead her to subjective discovery
 
of self, of commitment, passion,and authenticity. In
 
her attempt to manipulate Thea and Lovborg she functions
 
as the instrument of social pressures, the very type of
 
external pressure Kierkegaard warns against, the very
 
source of her own fatal inability to makes choices for
 
herself.
 
Eilert's choice is not a product of his reason.
 
On the contrary, he chooses with passion to dance about
 
the flame of lust and, like a moth, he falls. Rescued
 
from the fens of alcoholism through his symbolic mar
 
riage to Thea, through the application of his intellect
 
in the creation of their mutual child, the manuscript,
 
he is well along the road of the ethical vision of life,
 
when he is swept away backward into the maelstrom of
 
Hedda's destructive aestheticism. His "choice" is ob
 
viously wrong, and although Kierkegaard holds that there
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can be no wrong choice, he adds, paradoxically that suf
 
ficient passion can correct any wrongness in choice. Was
 
Eilert's intensity insufficient? One senses here a weak
 
ness in the existential paradigm.
 
Thea's character is perhaps more amenable. Walk
 
ing away from her husband, she defies society as she
 
throws herself at the feet of a man who has been a target
 
of social criticism. Passion, symbolized by her red
 
hair, is in her every act. She has inspired Lovborg to
 
creativity and discovered her authentic self--which is
 
the consummate woman, inspiring a man to create. Inspir
 
ation is her forte, and, promptly after Lovborg's demise,
 
she transfers her attention to Tesman, who has taken up
 
the task of resurrecting the manuscript (Ibsen, p. 600).
 
Though fear and timidity mark her personality, she makes
 
her way cautiously through the play without regard for
 
propriety.
 
Brack is simply an unauthenticated person, who
 
makes no progress toward or away from any redeemable
 
stance. Tesman, not a particularly multi-faceted person
 
ality, bumbles through all five acts in a state of semi-

consciousness, either attempting to satiate Hedda's in
 
satiable discontent, or, in the end, to repair the damage
 
caused by her devouring flame. To this extent, one would
 
have to place Tesman also in the ranks of the unauthenti
 
cated, even though he sought, as Kierkegaard dictated.
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the ethical life of marriage. One is tempted to place
 
Miss Julie in the realm of the ethical vision. She
 
nurses her other spinster sister toward as painless a
 
death as she can manage.
 
A pattern begins to emerge, with Thea represent
 
ing the positive expression of Kierkegaard's criterion-

less choice drawn from within and not from social crit
 
eria. Bound in matrimony to the sheriff, she turns away
 
from him toward Lovborg in an act that might (outside
 
Kierkegaard's views) have been termed unethical or im
 
moral. Her statement that she cannot live as though
 
she had never known Eilert can, according to the Kierke­
gaardian paradigm, be interpreted as a measure of her
 
courage (Ibsen, p. 525)' it is an ethical choice, and,
 
at the same time, it is contrary to established social
 
standards of action. It is ethical because it is drawn
 
from the essence of her being, and her symbolic child,
 
the manuscript, is her raison d'^etre. Witness the nim­
bleness with which she switches her attention from the
 
dead Eilert to the living George when she learns that
 
the manuscript can be resurrected. Her courage is func
 
tional; it is the staying power that sustains the elan
 
vital. the will to live and propagate the species.
 
It might appear that we have come full circle to
 
the biological criteria inherent in Schopenhauer's views.
 
Lovborg's alcoholism clouds the quality of his fateful
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choice to attend the drinking party, and leaves the reader
 
to decide whether his choice comes from the tyranny of
 
his "biology or from social pressures. His weakness for
 
the grape and his vanity, exploited "by Hedda's psycho
 
logical manipulation, com'bine to create ambivalent causes
 
for his choice to attend the party that leads directly
 
to his death.
 
Hedda's choice of suicide is also not a clear com
 
mand from her milieu, her society. In that sense it is
 
ethical and appears to emanate from within. And yet,
 
the dread of ostracization may be genetic in man the so
 
cial creature. Lovborg's alcoholism, a hybrid creation
 
of biology and social pressures, like Hedda's fear of
 
scandal, another curious hybrid, assumes with her fear a
 
thematic kinship in the Kierkegaardian-Schopenhaueran para
 
dox. Each of these two philosophers has declared for the
 
reality of subjectivism, one for a tyrannical one, the
 
other for a subjective free will. While Schopenhauer
 
might have applauded Hedda for her courage in the fin
 
al suicidal act and muttered, "Lucky man," of Eilert's
 
accidental death, Kierkegaard might have lamented them
 
both. For he believed that man seeks to escape himself
 
through his ceaseless becoming, and that the only sub
 
jective truth emerges from man's faithfulness to his own
 
unique self; Lovborg, succumbing to her machinations, ig
 
noring his own physical limitations, went proudly to
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his own demise.
 
The two philosophers are fundamentally alike in
 
that either view is capable of explicating Hedda Gahler
 
in terms of will; Schopenauer's biological determinism
 
is bleak and repressive in its implication that escape
 
lies only in suicide. Paradoxically Hedda appears en
 
trapped between the Kierkegaardian aesthetic stage,
 
where hedonism and boredom are the metaphors and the
 
opposite extreme of Schopenhauer's philosophy, cognizant
 
of her enslavement and planning escape through suicide.
 
The primary motive for Hedda's "leap" can be
 
interpreted equally well from either philosophical stance.
 
Schopenhauer, as the consummate egoist, has asserted that
 
suicide is the best answer for the human dilemma,
 
unless one is a philosopher able to reconcile appetite
 
with intellect and escape the puppeteer nature. In this
 
view, Hedda, not a philosopher, is excruciatingly aware
 
of her overwhelming impotence and takes the recommended
 
escape. If, however, one regards Hedda as the aesthete,
 
beset with the angst of ennui and turned in on herself
 
in a self-conscious and tautological nothingness, she
 
exemplifies Kierkegaard's prophecy that the narcissistic
 
individual must end in self destruction.
 
Hedda Gabler is lavish with allusions to death.
 
It is suggested through characterization, as Hedda be
 
comes death's minister; it is there in the movement of
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the plot; it is present in the old house, pungent with
 
an "odour of mortality." (Ibsen, p. 519) The house pre
 
viously owned by now deceased aristocracy is now occupied
 
by the motherless daughter of a death-dealing general
 
(now also deceased) and bound in sterile matrimony to
 
a man whose only relatives are sterile, spinster aunts,
 
one of whom passes away during the play. Relevant too
 
is the subject of George's creation (his own onus magnum)
 
which, like Hedda's fetus, never reaches fruition; it is
 
a look backward toward the Middle Ages, a disinterment
 
of the dead industries of the ancient society of Brabant,
 
a microcosmic representation of the play we are watching
 
and the society we see disintegrating before us. The in
 
stitutions represented by Judge Brack, by General Gabler,
 
the university, even by Sheriff Elvsted are failing, its
 
members sterile and impotent.
 
Hedda personifies the spector of death even as
 
it closes about her. Ibsen describes her as pale of com
 
plexion, with steel gray eyes expressing a cold, unruf
 
fled repose; and with death's characteristic love of
 
gloom, she carps about the sunlight (Ibsen, p. 511)•
 
Oh--there the servant has gone
 
and opened the veranda door and
 
let in a whole flood of sunlight.
 
She is acutely conscious that this is the season of death
 
(Ibsen, p. 51^)'
 
(...calm and mistress of herself.)
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I am looking at the leaves. They are so
 
withered...to think of it!--Already in
 
September.
 
Her interest in death transcends considerably an interest
 
in just her own. Seen loading her father's dueling pis
 
tols at the beginning of Act II, she threatens to kill
 
Judge Brack (Ibsen, p. 517)• It is an oversimplification
 
to suggest that justice shall die, for the Aristotelian
 
"thought" of Hedda Gabler indicates that the angst assoc
 
iated with living--broached by both Schopenhauer and
 
Kierkegaard--is beyond a matter of justice.
 
Hedda makes a heated denial of any interest in
 
life, when Lovborg remarks that she has a craving for
 
life. "Take care I Believe nothing of the sort." she
 
responds (Ibsen, p. 5^3)- She delights in the idea of
 
death.
 
Now I am burning your child, Thea!
 
Burning it curly locks!...Your child
 
and Eilert Lovborg's...I am burning—
 
I am burning your child. (Ibsen, p. 583)
 
Her frustrated attempts to move Eilert to a glorious
 
suicide is an attempt to impose over his eventual "cas
 
ual" end a heroic but anacronistic defiance in the face
 
of insuperable odds. Her view is essentially romantic
 
and nonfunctional in light of the Schopenhaueran reality,
 
for biological determinism reduces her dream to tragic
 
irony. Defying the determinism inherent in Eilert's al
 
coholism, and failing to move him to conquer this irre­
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sistible sequence of cause and effect, she retreats back
 
ward toward the final precipice. In a final spasm of de
 
spair and defiance, she attempts to wrest herself from the
 
strait jacket of determinism with suicide even as she as
 
sumes the role of fate (the very nemesis she flees) and
 
destroys the unborn child. The very rationalization that
 
leads her to suicide and freedom dooms her fetus to the
 
determinism she has sought to evade.
 
In the end her suicide leaves unanswered the ex
 
istential question of free will. Though she defied fate
 
with her own death, the taking of the life of her child-­
which has an existence of sorts, though perhaps not yet
 
an essence—makes it a totally impotent cog in a total
 
ly deterministic reality. It may be that Ibsen cleverly
 
left the final decision to the subjective and individual
 
choice of the reader.
 
There are other manifestations of death in Hedda
 
Gabler. Tesman also has a penchant for things dead. When
 
he responds to Lovborg that he would never have thought
 
of writing of the future, Hedda pointedly remarks, "H'm—
 
I dare say not." (Ibsen, p. 5^8) And Aunt Julie discov
 
ers her raison d'etre in nursing her sister to the end.
 
Her death was so calm, so beautiful. And
 
she had the unspeakable happiness of
 
seeing George once more--and bidding him
 
good-bye. (Ibsen, p. 585)
 
and later:
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I must prepare my dear one for
 
her rest as well as I can. She
 
shall go to her grave looking
 
her best. (Ibsen, p. 585)
 
That one look one's best in death perhaps speaks for
 
Hedda's social stratum. The splendid powdered corpse
 
is a manifestation of the socially proper facade, of
 
a penchant for propriety at least partially responsible
 
for Hedda's flight into suicide.
 
Miss Julie needs the reality of impending death
 
to provide her own life with meaning.
 
Oh, there's always some poor
 
invalid or other in want of nursing, un
 
fortunately...A burden! Heaven forgive
 
you child--It is no burden to me.
 
(Ibsen, p. 585)
 
She openly admits her need for the dying.
 
Oh, one soon makes friends with
 
the sick; and its such an absolute
 
necessity for me to have some one to
 
live for. (Ibsen, p. 585)
 
Death for Hedda, arrives as the existentialist
 
choice though it appears as the coward's choice. It is
 
the only choice for one who yearns for the power of
 
life and death over others, yet fears the consequences
 
of social scandal. There is an odd mixture of the ri
 
diculous (fear of scandal) and the sublime (love of
 
death) tempting one to consider Hedda's destruction as
 
a result of a psychotic frenzy induced by external forces,
 
transforming what at first appears as a wilful suicide
 
into cosmic cause and effect. One is also hard put to
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accredit Lovborg's death to anything except cosmic acci
 
dent, but it might be easily seen as the Schopenhaueran
 
accident, the result of his biological trajectory. In
 
this sense, Lovborg's death is no more nor less accident
 
al than was Hedda's. Ibsen's drama leaves the viewer to
 
decide.
 
In collecting philosophical thought useful in
 
the explication of Hedda Gabler, quite by happenstance,
 
I encountered a remarkably pertinent explication in
 
Freud's Thanatos myth. Freud postulates that the will
 
to death, thanatos, opposes and eventually defeats eros.
 
In this paradigm, eros vies with thanatos, and the po
 
larization of these two psychic forces are lucidly pre
 
sented in Hedda's characterization; The eros force is
 
evident in her pregnancy on the biological level, while
 
her suicide suggests the thanatos paradigm is at work.
 
It may be that a Freudian analysis is not appro
 
priate because he is not coeval with Ibsen. There is
 
nonetheless a relevance here between this tragedy and
 
the Freudian reduction of the hitherto somewhat mystic
 
human spirit--capable, in earlier literature, of apo
 
theosis or at least of a glorious heroism--to a psycho
 
logical equation of predictable and ironic helplessness.
 
A severely circumscribed will operating within narrow
 
limits produces a self-willed suicide. In this Aris
 
totelian tragedy, as Joseph Wood Krutch proclaimed, is
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19
 
indeed dead.
 
The differences between Schopenhauer and Kierke
 
gaard are not differences that would either move man
 
back to a milieu where the old classic tragedy would
 
again be possible, or provide him with total freedom,
 
or even totally abandon him to fate. They are merely ar
 
guments as to whether man has even one little iota of
 
freedom, in his choice of either enduring the despair
 
of life or defying destiny through the existentialist
 
leap (suicide). Because Freud's ideas continue the
 
trend toward the increased circumscription of the hu
 
man will I have included a Freudian explication of Hedda
 
Gabler.
 
Freud discovered a syndrome of behavior traits
 
common to the necrophile, and these characteristics are
 
strikingly similar to Hedda's. He notes a retention of
 
the anal stage of development, related to the way the
 
child acted in the sphere of bowel movements as a res
 
ponse to demands by his trainers. During an early phase
 
of childhood development, after the mouth is no longer
 
the main organ of lust or satisfaction, the anus becomes
 
an important erogenous zone, and most libidinal wishes
 
19
 
Krutch's funeral oration was not directed at
 
the more modern type of ironic tragedy in which the vic
 
tim has been deprived of volition and hence responsibil
 
ity for his fall.
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are centered around the retention of the excrements.
 
This anal hoarding character is orderly in a sterile and
 
rigid manner and cannot endure insecurity (Fromm, p. 29^).
 
Hedda remarks: "It is this genteel poverty I have managed
 
to drop into—! It makes life so pitiable! So utterly
 
ridiculous!" (Ibsen, p. 5^^)* Freud's reduction of Hed
 
da's heroic ideals to an anal hoarding syndrome makes
 
of her a defenseless heroine with a will no freer than
 
the alcoholic Lovborg's, in fact, no freer than her own
 
fetus.
 
The anal hoarding personality can only feel safe
 
by possession and control, since it is incapable of re
 
lating through love and productivity. Hedda must also
 
possess and control those around her (Fromm, p. 29^)•
 
One of the most pivotal bits in the play occurs when Hed
 
da manipulates Eilert into taking a drink against his
 
judgment; at another time she cries, "I want for once
 
in my life to have power to mould a human destiny." (Ib
 
sen, p. 5^^) Later, "She drags Mrs. Elvsted almost by
 
force toward the middle doorway." (Ibsen, p. 5^3) She
 
admits to Brack: "...I made use of Tesman..." (Ibsen, p.
 
563)• To Eilert she remarks that she does not love
 
George, explaining that she broke off her former rela­
20
 
Erich Fromm, The Anatomy of Human Destructive­
ness (New York; Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), P* 29^
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tionship with Eilert "because it threatened to develop
 
into something more serious (Ibsen, p. 555)' When Brack
 
suggests that Hedda loves George she responds, vehement
 
ly, "Faugh--don't use that sickening word!" (Ibsen, p.
 
533).
 
There is also a close relationship to sadism;
 
Thea reminds Hedda that when they were in school she was
 
always pulling Thea's hair, "...and once you said you
 
would "burn it off my head." (I"bsen, p. 521)
 
The necrophilous character is determined "by an
 
increase in narcissism, unrelatedness (or alienation)
 
and destructiveness, which is the malignant form of the
 
anal character, and the language of such a person is char
 
acterized "by frequent use of words referring to destruc
 
tion (Fromm, p. 294). Witness her threats to Thea; she
 
threatens Brack, urges suicide upon Lovborg, and eventual
 
ly destroys herself and her fetus. There is also a direct
 
connection between destruction itself and the manner or
 
technique of the process (Fromm, p. 344). Hedda is in
 
sistent that Eilert shoot himself in the temple, the or
 
gan of the intellect; she is wretched when she learns that
 
he died of a visceral wound. Even suicide has technique.
 
If the necrophile is provided with a satisfactory
 
solution, such as prestige and admiration, to an exces
 
sive narcissism, the contained destructiveness may never
 
be overtly expressed in any significant way (Fromm, p.
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365)' While single Hedda enjoyed countless admirers, but
 
after marriage, tradition required that her personality be
 
subordinate to the somewhat insipid George Tesman. If the
 
necrophile fails to obtain prestige, the malignant as
 
pect will manifest itself in a craving for destruction
 
(Fromm, p. 36^), and the minimal recognition Hedda re
 
ceived was not sufficient. Necrophilia is the outcome
 
of an unlived life or the failure to arrive at a stage
 
beyond narcissism and indifference. If one cannot crack
 
the shell of his total narcissism he can only escape
 
the unbearable sense of vital impotence and nothingness
 
by affirming himself in the act of destruction of the
 
life that he has not been able to create (Fromm, p. 36^).
 
Ironically Hedda is impotently creating a new life in her
 
womb. But these Freudian views are so pertinent to Hed
 
da's dilemma that they are the basis for almost every mod
 
ern interpretation of the role.
 
Other traits of the necrophile are boredom, schiz
 
ophrenia, cold aloofness, a specific attitude toward the
 
past and property, and a predilection for dark rooms.
 
Not the least dangerous result of insuf
 
ficiently compensated boredom is violence
 
and destructiveness...such persons have no
 
interest in anything... or anybody except
 
of the most superficial kind. (Fromm, p. 339)
 
They only see gray skies and have little zest for life.
 
In fact they would often rather be dead. Severely necro­
philous people are very dangerous. They are the haters
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who favor bloodshed and destruction (Fromm, p. 339)•
 
Ennui is a prime characteristic of Hedda. She
 
admits she has the facility for "...boring myself to
 
death."(Ibsen, p. 5^5) And she later remarks; "...oh,
 
my dear Mr. Brack how mortally bored I have been." (Ib
 
sen, p. 537) She also exhibits the necrophile's sym­
tom of schizophrenia. When Tesman asks her why she is
 
cruel to Aunt Julia, she answers: "(nervously crossing
 
the room). Well, you see--these impulses come over me
 
all of a sudden; and I cannot resist them." (Ibsen, p.
 
5^1)
 
Her reason for marrying Tesman when she did not
 
love him is typical; "I had...danced myself tired...my
 
day was done--(With a slight shudder). Oh, no--I won't
 
say that, nor think it either," (Ibsen, p. 538) It is
 
evident early on that her rational personality is in mor
 
tal combat with the necrophilous personality.
 
The necrophile's penchant for acquiring property
 
is evident too. Hedda has so much luggage that there is
 
no room on the carriage for Tesman's aunt. Later she re
 
marks that the old piano no longer fits the decor, but
 
when Tesman suggests they exchange it, she will not part
 
with it; "No, no—no exchange. I don't want to part with
 
it. Suppose we put it there in the inner room and then
 
get another here in its place." (Ibsen, p. 515) The ne
 
crophilous person generally has a preference for colors
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such as black or brown that absorb light, and a distaste
 
for bright radiant colors. I have earlier pointed out
 
Hedda's penchant for closed draperies and gloomy rooms.
 
Finally the Freudian concept of inversion ex
 
plains Hedda's will to power. The general's portrait
 
dominates the set over the sofa. She is a biological
 
woman yearning for power in a milieu where power can only
 
be seized by a man. Her will for power, rather than for
 
progeny, suggests the mind of a man, a genetic anomaly
 
imprisoned in the body of a woman in nineteenth-century
 
Europe.
 
I have attempted to show how the advent of the
 
realistic period was precipitated by the accumulating
 
data from the various centers of philosophical thought
 
prevalent in the nineteenth-century community of inquiry
 
such as the Naturalists, Rationalists and the Psycholo
 
gists. While aristocratic man, even omnipotent God, was
 
debilitated, the common man--despite the excesses and
 
failures of the French revolution--began to emerge on a
 
hi^er level of the social status. The general consensus
 
was that if aristocratic man could be reduced to the de
 
terministic equation, that if science exposed man's in
 
ability to control his own destiny, then the proletariat
 
was no less emasculate. Hence, the move toward egalitar­
ianism continued apace.
 
Ibsen's dramatizing of the thoughts of these
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three philosophers has put into perspective, in the his
 
torical period in which they wrote, the social and psych
 
ological implications of their observations. Though
 
Schopenhauer slightly predated Ibsen's "golden period"
 
and Freud succeeded it, their incisive scrutiny along
 
with that of Kierkegaard, has aptly characterized this
 
period as the last agony of an epoch.
 
Along with the debilitation of deity went the
 
pessimistic realization that, with God so effete, man
 
himself was without the power of self-determination, was
 
without free will. Schopenhauer epitomized this totally
 
unredeeming view; but man--unable to long endure such un
 
remitting pessimism—began to turn toward the half-way
 
house of Kierkegaardian existentialism, where humanity
 
was provided at least with some degree of latitude in his
 
power to determine his own destiny. And indeed Freud's
 
inquiry into the human psyche, though postulating a un­
versal equation in biology, stimulus and response, none
 
theless, demonstrated as its own basic raison that to un
 
derstand one's own constitution was to somehow re-acquire
 
some of the lost magnificence of man. That is to say,
 
when a man understands the working of his knee-joint, for
 
example, the discovery of its mechanical principle does
 
not render man any the more mechanical. The fact that
 
the mind has the awesome power to contemplate itself con
 
templating itself, lends it a strength that cannot be de­
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nied, if it is agreed that knowledge is power.
 
Into this cauldron came the chronicler Ihsen,
 
with an ear to the nineteenth-century winds of change,
 
hearing the still metamorphosing maelstrom of debate,
 
conditioned by years of theater management and nearly
 
half a century of successful playwrighting: Thus he
 
wrote a masterful story of a group of people who were
 
caught in a volatile social flux. Ibsen's masterpiece,
 
catching these tragic figures in their struggles, accom
 
plishes several objectives. It shows how the dramatist,
 
perhaps before the historian, can discern with remark
 
able accuracy the historical significance of an era.
 
It shows how Ibsen, with exemplary virtuosity, was able
 
to correlate several conflicting philosophical views, and
 
even anticipate the trajectory of history (Freud's opus
 
magnum). It is exhibit "A" offered as proof that Ibsen
 
was a playwright of classical proportions who could yet
 
claim that same popularity with the masses as have all
 
artists who have survived the test of time.
 
The demonstrated ease with which Hedda Gabler
 
has been explicated through these different perspectives
 
is impressive evidence to the multiplicity of Ibsen's vi
 
sion, his skills as an observer, and his talent as a
 
playwright of monumental capacity. The immediacy of his
 
nineteenth century vision is apparent in his masterful
 
dramatization of the existential reality and the irre­
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sistibility with which the dilemma of freedom dawned in
 
21
the affairs of man. This "tragedy of freedom" is es
 
sentially a twentieth century phenomenon.
 
If one could characterize classical literature
 
as literature depicting the synthesis of the whole man;
 
as a composite of the head, the heart, and the body, each
 
representing the rational, the romantic, and the natural
 
ist view; if one could see the classical man as one who-­
by virtue of biological, religious, and social tyranny-­
has come by his "essence before existence," then one must
 
classify Hedda Gabler as a classical drama. 22 But the
 
prestidigitator Ibsen, who has been called, perhaps quite
 
justifiably, the father of modern drama, bridged that gap
 
that separates classical yesterday from contemporary to
 
day. And he performed this feat by blending two funda
 
mentally alien philosophies; existentialism with its
 
existence-before-essence, and the naturalistic essence­
before-existence. Conceived on the classical soil of his
 
own milieu, his art adhered to the classical dicta of de
 
terminism and form; but as his creation took wing it un­
21
 
A man is free, claim the existentialists, when
 
he chooses his own will over the claims of others and ac
 
cepts the fact of his own death.
 
22 Wesley Barnes, Existentialism (Woodbury, New
 
York: Barren's Educational Series, Inc., 1968). The read
 
er is referred to this enlightening book for a comparison
 
of existentialistic and classical literature.
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derwent transformation and somewhere in flight it became
 
a manifesto of freedom, shaking loose the fetters of the
 
classical form, unfurling the pinions of existentialism,
 
and ushering in the era of modern drama.
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